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COMMENTS
BAD MOTIVE PLUS HARM EQUALS A TORT
WARREN A. SFAVEY *
An adjacent proprietor has no right to light and air
coming.., across the land of his neighbor."
On the strength of this statement the Rhode Island court ' re-
cently held, as the most important reason for refusing an injunction,
that a landowner may rightfully build a fence for the sole purpose of
depriving his neighbor of light and air. The court argues that if one
has no right to such light and air there can be no duty on the part
of the defendant not to obstruct them; that the maxim "sic utere
tuo" should not be applied so as to confer gratuitously upon an adja-
cent property holder incorporeal rights; that this differs from the
situations in which the defendant sends smoke, smells or noise over
plaintiff's land; that "[v]iolations of ethics or morals which do not
harm the public weal, it [the municipal law] wisely leaves to the
sanctions of the moral law. At that bar only can the motives of men
be fully appraised and fairly judged." 2
As to the first statement, it would appear that the court mis-
conceives the nature of the rights of a landowner. The fact that the
Rhode Island legislature had enacted a spite fence statute, although
this was not applicable in the present case, indicated the legislative
belief that landowners are subject to some duties to their neighbors.
The fallacies of the last statement of the court and its companion,
that "an otherwise lawful act does not become unlawful because per-
formed with a bad motive," I had supposed were so thoroughly ex-
posed by Dean Ames two generations ago 3 that no court would now
venture to make either of them.
In fact, there are few "absolute rights," certainly none to harm
others, although policy sometimes gives an immunity from civil lia-
bility. It would be improper to state that the civil immunity of a
judge or senator in defaming others creates a "right" in him to do so.
It is still true in many states that one may cause another to be very
unhappy by means of insults without being subjected to an action of
tort, but where such a rule prevails it is only on the ground that
* Professor of Law, Harvard University School of Law.
3 Musumeci v. Leonardo, 75 A. 2d 175 (R. I. 1950).
2 Id. at 178.
3 Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive
of the Actor, 18 HAv. L. REv. 411 (1905).
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there is no substantial harm, or not the kind of harm for which it is
expedient to give redress.4 Again it is true that one has a right not
to aid another or to deal with another. However, one cannot prop-
erly refuse a gift or to deal with another if refusal is intended to
cause the other to commit a breach of contract or unlawful act.5
Under modern labor legislation one cannot refuse to employ if the
denial is based upon racial grounds 6 or because of membership or
nonmembership in a labor union.7 It has frequently been said that
one can enforce a lawful claim against another although the enforce-
ment is from a bad motive; 8 in this case, however, the defendant is
committing a wrong in not making payment and even in this situa-
tion the right may not be without limitation.9 One probably has a
right to eject trespassers irrespective of motive,10 but again this rep-
resents the righting of a wrong committed by the trespasser.
On the other hand, the right to compete for business is today
generally recognized to be dependent upon the existence of a proper
motive. 1 The common right to use public roads may become un-
lawful if for an improper purpose 12 and even the exercise of the
right of free speech may be limited although the words used are
proper, if the motive is to induce rioting.13 In some states it is an
actionable tort to make a true but defamatory statement with a bad
motive; 14 in all states, the exercise of a "privilege" is dependent
upon its being used for the purpose for which it is given.15
4 Contrast the language of Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P. 2d
696 (1948), with that in Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A. 2d 81 (Mun.
Ct. App. D. C. 1946).
5 RESTATEmNT, TORTS § 766, comment g (1939); Holmes, Privilege,
Malice, aid Intent, 8 HRv. L. REv. 1, 13 (1894).
6 MAss. ANNm. LAws, c. 151B, § 4 (Supp. 1950). "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice:
1. For an employer, by himself or his agent, because of the race, color,
religious creed, national origin, age, or ancestry of any individual, to refuse to
hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or
to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions
or privileges of employment, unless based upon a bona fide occupational quali-
fication." See also N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 42.
749 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158(a)(3) (Supp.
1951).
8 South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505 (1854).
9American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
Georgia, 256 U. S. 350 (1921).
10 Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N. Y. 324 (1881) ; Brothers v. Morris, 49 Vt. 460
(1877); Oakes v. Wood, 2 M. & W. 791, 150 Eng. Rep. 977 (1837).
"I Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909).
32 Beatty v. Gilbanks, 9 Q. B. D. 308 (1882).
'3 Compare Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951), with Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949). For an able discussion of the limitations
which may be imposed on the exercise of free speech to prevent breach of
the peace, see Note, 25 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 295 (1951).
'
4 Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 118 N. W. 1071 (1908). At common
law, the defense of truth was not available in criminal proceedings for libel.
15 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 890, comment c (1939).
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Perhaps the clearest cases for recognizing that rights are rela-
tive to the purpose for which they are exercised are those involving
adjacent landowners or possessors. In a crowded world, one holds
one's property subject to the interests of others. To a greater or less
extent, we all create sound waves and infiltrate the atmosphere with
floating and alien particles. We exchange sounds, smells and dust
with our neighbors. If we cause an excess of the disagreeable ele-
ments to our neighbor or to his premises than is permissible for the
place or the kind of business we are operating, we commit a nuisance.
Whether or not there is a nuisance depends upon whether there has
been abuse of these common interests. To determine whether stores
which create traffic congestion, or factories which pollute the atmos-
phere with smoke are nuisances, the benefit to the landowner and
to the public from the activity is taken into consideration. 16 Clearly
if there is no benefit to the public and if the defendant acts to satisfy
only his interests in hatred there is no reason to protect him.
The court distinguishes the sending of something upon another's
land from the interception of light rays, a specious but spurious dis-
tinction. An undertaking establishment which transmits no more
than gloomy thoughts can be justified, if at all, in a residential neigh-
borhood only because of public necessity.17 There would seem to be
no essential difference between sending over another's land artificial
light rays or magnifying the sun's rays and depriving another of the
rays from the sun. In one case there is a deprivation of darkness;
in the other a deprivation of light. It should be noted that the de-
fendant's conduct was not "non-feasance," a shibboleth used by some
courts to deny recovery, but consisted of activity.
It is true that the right to erect useful structures is not dimin-
ished by the fact that the builder desired to harm his neighbor.
Furthermore, aside from zoning statutes, there was no common law
limitation upon the height of such structures, so that to this extent
the exercise of the right to cut off light is different from the right
to make noises, smells or dust. This, however, does not mean that
the right should not be limited to its exercise for a proper purpose,
a limitation common to the exercise of all rights or privileges to harm
others. The fact that in the United States one does not acquire the
right to receive light by lapse of time does not mean that he has no
rights. It means only that he acquires no additional rights from the
inactivity of his neighbors.
To revert to the "no right" of the plaintiff: it is of course ob-
vious that whether the plaintiff has a right depends upon whether his
neighbor has a duty not to interfere with the plaintiff's interest. This
16 Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N. W. 2d 1 (1947) (riding
academy) ; Essick v. Shillam, 347 Pa. 373, 32 A. 2d 416 (1943) (supermarket).
27 Compare Gunderson v. Anderson, 190 Minn. 245, 251 N. W. 515 (1933)
("constant reminder of death"), with Devereux v. Grand-Americas Junior
Corp., 85 N. Y. S. 2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in turn should depend upon the motive in acting. There is no reason
why the law should protect the interests of a person in harming an-
other and this it does where it creates a right to harm another for a
purely spiteful motive. A hundred years ago the decision of the
Rhode Island court would have been a commonplace, but the prin-
ciples of torts have been discovered since then. One of the most
important developments has been in the recognition of the extent to
which motive plays a part in the creation of liability for harm. This
is particularly noticeable in the case of landowners. Since 1900 the
tendency of the courts and legislatures has been to deny protection
to one who is actuated solely by ill will, as may be seen by the cases
involving spite fences,18 percolating waters L9 and noises. 20  It is
unfortunate that in a case in which the erection of a fence appears to
have been justified, the court found it desirable to announce a rule
outmoded because inconsistent with modem ideas of justice.
Is Cases collected in Note, 133 A. L. R. 691 (1941).
29 Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687, 72 N. E. 849
(1904); RFSTATamENT, TORTS §§ 860-863 (1939).2 0 Collier v. Ernst, 46 D. & C. 1, 31 Del. Co. R. 49 (Pa. C. P. 1942).
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